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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
TRAVIS BERTOCH, : Case No. 20030111-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse and permit Bertoch to 
withdraw his conditional guilty plea because Bertoch properly preserved his argument 
for appeal, the trial court erred by denying Bertoch's motion to suppress the evidence 
taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment and by denying Bertoch's motion to 
suppress the statements taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and Bertoch is not 
required to show prejudice when appealing from a conditional guilty plea. 
ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse because: (A) Bertoch 
properly preserved both his Fourth and Fifth Amendment arguments, (B) the trial court 
erred by ruling the frisk did not violate the Fourth Amendment, (C) the trial court erred 
by ruling Bertoch's pre-Miranda statements were not elicited in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, and (D) Bertoch is not required to show prejudice. 
A. Bertoch Properly Preserved Both His Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
Arguments For Appeal. 
The preservation requirement exists because "the trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and "a defendant 
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of enhanc[ing] 
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,... claiming] on 
appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74,^11,10 P.3d 346 
(quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Accordingly, an issue is 
properly preserved if "'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an 
opportunity to rule on the issue.'"" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 
129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted); Holmstrom v. C.R. England. Inc.. 2000 UT 
App 239,Tf26, 8 P.3d 281 (holding "party must specifically raise the issue, such that it is 
brought 'to a "level of consciousness'"" (citations omitted)); State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 
769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting defendant's objection timely because he "met the 
requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his constitutional objection in the trial 
court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)). This Court should address both 
Bertoch's Fourth and Fifth Amendment arguments because they are properly preserved. 
1. Bertoch's Fourth Amendment Argument is Properly Preserved. 
The State argues Bertoch did not preserve his Fourth Amendment argument 
because he "never attacked the weapons pat-down" and "affirmatively conceded its 
permissibility" below Aple. Br. at 10. The record, however, undermines the State's 
2 
argument. R. 59-60; 287; 295:2-5. In his memorandum in support of his motion to 
suppress, Bertoch argued nthe paraphernalia (pipe) and the 'baggie' of green leafy 
substance must be suppressed" because it violated the Fourth Amendment. R. 59. He 
acknowledged the United States Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), that flsearch[es] for weapons in a pat-down or frisk" are generally permissible. 
Id. But he argued the frisk in this case was not permissible because Trooper Witte 
(Witte) did not have a reasonable fear that Bertoch was armed and presently dangerous. 
Id. Specifically, Bertoch explained that Witte "testified at the Preliminary Hearing that 
he initiated the 'frisk' because of'officer's safety,'" and later clarified on cross 
examination that he feared for his safety because "he had been 'rear-ended' twice when 
he had previously made stops of other vehicles." IcL_ Bertoch then argued that Witte did 
not have reasonable fear to justify a frisk because being "'rear-ended' twice during stops 
has nothing to do with patting down a person." Id. at 59-60. Later, Bertoch appeared at 
a motion hearing prepared to answer any questions the trial court had about his argument. 
R. 295: 2. The trial court, however, had no questions and stated it would based its ruling 
on the memoranda submitted by the parties. Id at 4-5. Thus, by arguing the frisk 
violated the Fourth Amendment because Witte had no reasonable fear of danger, Bertoch 
provided the trial court an opportunity to rule on the legality of the frisk and surrendered 
any possible strategy to forego objecting and save the issue for appeal. R. 59-60. 
Moreover, the trial court did rule on the validity of the frisk. R. 287:4. Specifically, the 
3 
trial court ruled the frisk did not violate the Fourth Amendment because, even though 
Witte's fear of being rear-ended had nothing to do with Bertoch's perceived 
dangerousness, "[o]nce [Witte] smelled alcohol and took Mr. Bertoch out of the vehicle, 
he had a right to frisk him."1 Id 
Besides, even if Bertoch had not raised the sub-argument that the frisk violated 
the Fourth Amendment because Witte lacked reasonable fear of danger, he properly 
preserved the issue for appeal by arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 
See State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332,Tf25 n. 4, 37 P.3d 260 (addressing identity 
issue even though not specifically preserved because defendant preserved probable cause 
issue and "State bears the burden of proving" articulable suspicion (including identity) 
within probable cause issue). Unlike the cases cited by the State in its brief, Bertoch did 
not change his argument on appeal. See. Aple. Br. at 8; State v. Richins. 2004 UT App 
36,^ fl[9, 11, 86 P.3d 759 (holding defendant did not preserve his argument that the trial 
1
 The State suggests that the trial court's ruling on the validity of the frisk and 
Witte's explanation of his safety concerns are summary because Bertoch did not "contest 
the reasonableness" of Witte's "safety concerns" or challenge the validity of the frisk. 
Aple. Br. at 9 n. 7. Contrary to the State's argument, Bertoch challenged both the 
reasonableness of Witte's safety concerns and the validity of the frisk. R. 59-60. Thus, it 
was the State's burden to present enough evidence to show Witte had reasonable 
suspicion of a weapon to justify the warrantless frisk. See State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 
480, 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding "officer must justify a pat down search by 
'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion'" (citation omitted)). Absent a sufficient showing 
of reasonable suspicion, the trial court should have ruled the frisk was unconstitutional. 
See State v. Warren. 2003 UT 36,1(14, 78 P.3d 590 (holding trial court must decide 
reasonableness of frisk "objectively according to the totality of the circumstances"). 
4 
court violated rule 11(e)(4)(B) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (requiring 
factual basis for plea) because below he argued the trial court violated rule 11(e)(4)(A) 
(requiring defendant understands elements of offense before plea) and trial court's 
findings only pertained to rule 11(e)(4)(A)); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding defendant did not preserve argument that conviction violated First 
Amendment because argued below that conviction violated "right to equal protection and 
due process"; argument on appeal "concerned different facts and involved different legal 
criteria"; and "trial court made no findings relevant to those legal doctrines"); RochelL 
850 P.2d at 484 n. 3 (noting defendant waived "issue of voluntariness of consent" 
because argued below detention and frisk were illegal but did not argue subsequent 
consent was product of police exploitation). Rather, he maintained his original 
argument, merely developing it where necessary to satisfy the rigorous demands of 
appellate review. Cf. Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks. 2000 UT 30^38. 996 P.2d 1043 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring) (noting preservation rule exists "so that the refining process 
that occurs through proper claim preservation and development through the trial and 
appellate courts brings issues to us fully developed and briefed"). 
2. Bertoch's Fifth Amendment Argument Is Properly Preserved. 
The State argues Bertoch waived his Fifth Amendment argument because he did 
not challenge the trial court's finding that his statements "were volunteered." Aple. Br. 
at 12, 18. This argument, however, is meaningless because the State concedes that 
5 
Bertoch preserved his argument that his statements were extracted during custodial 
interrogation. Id at 12-13. "The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from being 
compelled to give evidence against themselves.1' State v. Bunting. 2002 UT App 
195,^14, 51 P.3d 37 (quotations and citations omitted). When invoked to suppress a 
statement, the Fifth Amendment requires the prosecution to demonstrate "the statement 
was made voluntarily," and the trial court to "determine whether [the] statement was 
made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort." Id. 
(quotations and citations omitted). In other words, if a defendant argues a statement was 
illegally obtained through custodial interrogation, he is implicitly arguing the statement 
was made involuntarily. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 462 (1966) (holding, to 
satisfy Fifth Amendment standards, evidence must show "the accused was not 
involuntarily impelled to make a statement, when but for the improper influences he 
would have remained silent"); Bram v. United States. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (holding, 
"wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, 
the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment... commanding that no 
person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."); State 
v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1986) ("In order for a statement to be deemed 
voluntary as a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, the statement must not have been 
elicited by threats or violence or by any direct or implied promises."). 
Here, Bertoch preserved his Fifth Amendment claim by arguing his pre-Miranda 
6 
statements were elicited while he was under custodial interrogation. R. 57-59. Because 
voluntariness was implicitly included in his argument, Bertoch was not required to 
simultaneously argue that his statements elicited under custodial interrogation were 
involuntary. Id Moreover, the trial court recognized the inherent presence of 
involuntariness in Bertoch's custodial interrogation argument and ruled not only that 
Bertoch was not "in custody" but also that Bertoch's statements were "volunteered." R. 
287:3. Thus, because the trial court ruled on the voluntariness of Bertoch's statements, 
the issue of voluntariness is preserve. See. Holmstromu 2000 UT App 239 at ^26 (holding 
issue preserved if "it is brought 'to [trial court's] "level of consciousness"'" (citations 
omitted)). Finally, Bertoch was not required to renew his motion after the trial court's 
ruling. See State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4,1J14,20 P.3d 265 (holding Utah courts "will 
not require a party to continue to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court 
has rendered a decision on the issue"). 
R The Trial Court Erred Bv Ruling the Frisk Did Not Violate the Fourth 
Amendment, 
First, the State attempts to minimize the intrusiveness of the frisk in this case by 
citing a footnote in Terry that describes a frisk as a search of "'every portion of the 
[person's] body/" including "'arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area 
about the testicles, and the entire surface of the legs down to the feet.'" Aple. Br. at 9 n. 
7 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 16 n. 13 (1968)). This footnote, however, does not define 
the Supreme Court's vision of a frisk under Terry. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 & n. 13. 
7 
Rather, it is an example provided to demonstrate the extent to which a frisk "may inflict 
indignity and arouse strong resentment." Id. In reality, the "Terry Court described a 
frisk as 'a carefully limited search of the outer clothing . . . in an attempt to discover 
weapons which might be used to assault' an officer." State v. White. 856 P.2d 656, 660 
n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). In Terry, the officer "patted down the 
outside of [the defendant's] clothing." Terry. 392 U.S. at 7. Similarly, in this case, Witte 
testified that he "patted [Bertoch] down" and "performed a Terry frisk on [Bertoch]." R. 
294:7, 9, 14, 17. Thus, contrary to the State's suggestion, Witte's frisk of Bertoch was a 
frisk as defined by Terry and regulated by the Fourth Amendment. 
Second, the State argues Bertoch's arrest triggered either the independent source 
doctrine or the inevitable discovery doctrine, bypassing the illegal frisk and making the 
evidence admissible through a valid search incident to arrest.2 Aple. Br. at 16. The 
inevitable discovery doctrine "enables courts to look to the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence and asks whether the police would 
2
 To make this argument, the State cites only two cases and provides no analysis or 
case comparison. Aple. Br. at 16. Thus, this Court should decline to address the 
inevitable discovery or independent source doctrines because the State has inadequately 
briefed these issues. See State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT l,Tf31, 973 P.2d 404 (noting that 
adequate briefing "'requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that 
authority and reasoned analysis based upon that authority'" and refusing to consider 
constitutional arguments for inadequate briefing where appellant merely cited relevant 
constitutional provisions and four cases but without any meaningful analysis of that 
authority (citation omitted)). 
8 
have discovered the evidence despite the illegality.113 State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 
30,1(14, 76 P.3d 1159. However, it only applies "'[i]f the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have 
been discovered by lawful means.'" Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431, 444 
(1984)) (other citation omitted). MA crucial element of inevitable discovery is 
independence; there must be some 'independent basis for discovery/ [ United States v. 
Boatwright 822 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1987)], and 'the investigation that inevitably 
would have led to the evidence [must] be independent of the constitutional violation, 
[United States v. Larsen. 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997)].'" Id at1jl6 (second 
alteration in original). 'Thus, 'the fact or likelihood that makes the discovery inevitable 
[must] arise from circumstances other than those disclosed by the illegal search itself."1 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 864-65). 
If the inevitable discovery doctrine was not raised before or relied on by the trial 
court, an appellate court can still apply it to affirm a trial court's decision to deny a 
defendant's motion to suppress. See. id at 1f9 (holding "appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on 
the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to 
3
 The "independent source doctrine describes one method of satisfying the 
inevitable discovery exception, which is to demonstrate that the same evidence 
uncovered by illegal police activity would have been obtained by an entirely 
independent, prior investigation." State v. James. 2000 UT 80,^15, 13 P.3d 576. 
9 
be the basis of its ruling or action" (citations omitted)). "However, not only must the 
alternative ground be apparent on the record, it must also be sustainable by the factual 
findings of the trial court." Id. ,u[T]he court of appeals must then determine whether the 
facts as found by the trial court are sufficient to sustain the decision of the trial court on 
the alternate ground.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
For example, in Commonwealth v. Mover. 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 108 (Va. Ct. 
App. March 8,1994) (No. 1917-93-4) (memorandum opinion), an officer stopped the 
defendant for running a red light. Id. at * l-*2; see Addendum A. Because the officer 
"detected a strong odor of alcohol," he had the defendant exit the vehicle. Id_ When the 
defendant refused to remove his hands from his pockets, the officer reached into the 
defendant's pocket and discovered drugs. Id. at *2-*3. Later, the officer "had [the 
defendant] perform field sobriety tests," and "placed [the defendant] under arrest for 
driving while intoxicated." Id. At trial, the court suppressed the drug evidence because 
the officer "left out the critical step of the pat down." Id. at *4. The trial court rejected 
the Commonwealth's inevitable discovery argument because, "The record fails to 
disclose any evidence regarding standard arrest or search procedures employed by the 
Fairfax City Police Department in drunk driving cases." Id. at *4-*5. The appellate 
court affirmed because "the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence to support a 
finding that there was 'a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have 
been discovered by lawful means but for the police misconduct.'" Id. at *7 (citation 
10 
omitted). "The only evidence presented by the Commonwealth relevant to the issue of 
inevitable discovery was that [the defendant] was given a field sobriety test and was later 
arrested for driving while intoxicated. No evidence or argument was presented regarding 
the normal course of police investigation and procedures in cases of this nature." IcL at 
In this case, the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress should not be 
affirmed under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The State did not argue the inevitable 
discovery doctrine below, and the trial court did not rely on the inevitable discovery 
doctrine in its ruling. R. 139-151; 287; 295. Accordingly, the inevitable discovery 
doctrine is only available as an alternative ground of affirmance and must be sustainable 
by the factual findings of the trial court. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at [^9. However, in 
its ruling, the trial court made no findings from which this Court can establish the 
evidence found during and after the illegal frisk would have been inevitably discovered. 
R. 287. The trial court found the frisk was lawful M[o]nce the officer smelled alcohol and 
took Mr. Bertoch out of the vehicle.'1 R. 287:4. From there, the trial court found, 
"Bertoch was later arrested." LI The trial court made no findings that Bertoch's arrest 
was inevitable or that the evidence discovered against Bertoch would have been 
inevitably found during a search incident to arrest or booking search.4 R. 287. 
4
 Although the trial court held the evidence was admissible because it was "taken 
at the search incident to arrest," the trial court made this ruling based on its previous 
ruling that the frisk was valid. R. 287:4. The trial court made no finding that even if the 
11 
Furthermore, even if this Court were to look to the record rather than the trial 
court's findings, there is still not sufficient evidence to support the application of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine. The State presented no evidence or argument to show 
Bertoch would inevitably have been arrested and lawfully searched incident to that arrest. 
R. 139-151; 295. Specifically, there is no evidence or argument in the record 
establishing Bertoch would inevitably have been arrested under M[r]outine or standard 
police procedures" and searched incident to that arrest. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at f 17 
("Routine or standard police procedures are often a compelling and reliable foundation 
for inevitable discovery."); see State v. Callahan, 2004 UT App 164,^10, 499 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 23 (holding inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply because State "adduced no 
evidence during the trial detailing the normal course of activities that occur after a 
controlled narcotics buy is complete"); Mover. 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 108 at *7-*8 
(rejecting inevitable discovery argument because "[n]o evidence or argument was 
presented regarding the normal course of police investigation and procedures in cases of 
this nature"); State v. Lewis, 1990 Kan. App. LEXIS 897,* 14-* 15, 803 P.2d 212 (Kan. 
Ct. App. December 14, 1990) (No. 64, 467) (memorandum decision) (suppressing 
contents of defendant's purse illegally seized even though defendant was lawfiilly 
arrested because "[t]here is nothing in the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress 
or of the trial itself on which any court could conclude the purse would have been 
frisk was illegal, the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. Id. 
12 
available for a custodial search if Officer [] had not taken it out of the car"). Instead, the 
results of Bertoch's blood test suggest Bertoch would not inevitably have been arrested.5 
R. 105. In fact, Bertoch was never charged with DUI and the booking sheet detailing 
Bertoch's arrest shows Bertoch was not even booked for DUI, but for illegal 
possession/use of a controlled substance. R. 2-5; 25; see. Addendum B; Callahan. 2004 
UT App 164 at f 9 (holding "the argument that 'if we hadn't done it wrong, we would 
have done it right,' is far from compelling" (quotations and citation omitted)). 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse because the evidence should have been 
suppressed. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at [^11 (holding State's failure to meet 
5
 In its brief, the State concedes Bertoch's blood tests came back negative for drug 
or alcohol impairment. Aple. Br. at 6 n. 6. The State then notes the "final toxicology 
report was not included in the record" and hints that Bertoch may actually have been 
impaired. Id The State's suggestion is inappropriate for this Court's consideration 
because it is not supported by any evidence in the record. See. Tisco Intermountain & 
State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n. 744 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 1987) (holding "it 
cannot be assumed that facts exist" in the absence of evidence). Moreover, the State 
suggests that Bertoch "admitted that he failed the field tests and exhibited signs of 
impairment" to support his argument that he was incapable of knowingly waiving his 
Miranda rights. Aple. Br. at 6 n. 6. Bertoch, however, did not admit impairment. Id.; R. 
66-68. In fact, he specifically argued that he was not impaired and did not appear 
impaired because Witte followed him "to observe his driving pattern" and saw "nothing 
to criticize"; Witte acknowledged Bertoch had "broken ankles 'a couple' of times but did 
not note that Mr. Bertoch was suffering from a crushed toe"; Witte did not consider that 
Bertoch's "eye problems" might have been explained by his "need to wear corrective 
lenses"; and "the chemical tests disproved the presence of both alcohol and 
marijuana/metabolites." R. 66-67. Rather, Bertoch argued his inability to knowingly 
waive his Miranda rights was caused by non-substance-related factors such as 
nervousness caused by being followed, stopped, frisked, accused, tested, searched, 
transported, and arrested by armed officers; and inattention caused by the pain of various 
physical injuries. R. 67-68. 
13 
preponderance of evidence requirement of inevitable discovery doctrine required reversal 
because when "State has the burden of proof and the record on appeal fails to sustain any 
theory of admissibility, the State 'is not entitled to a remand to put on new evidence'"). 
C The Trial Court Erred By Ruling the Statements Taken Before the Miranda 
Reading Were Admissible. 
The State argues the trial court did not err by ruling Bertoch's pre-Miranda 
statements were admissible because Bertoch was not under custodial interrogation when 
he made the statements. Aple. Br. at 17-18. To support this argument, the State suggests 
Bertoch's case is similar to Salt Lake City v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983), and 
State v. Zepeda. 2003 UT App 298 (memorandum decision); and distinguishable from 
State v. Mirquet. 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996). Aple. Br. at 17-18. The State, however, 
provides no case comparisons to demonstrate its proposed similarities and distinctions. 
Id. Moreover, a careful reading of the cited cases shows Bertoch's case is 
distinguishable from Carner and similar to Mirquet. and too little detail is provided in 
Zepeda to conduct a meaningful comparison. 
First, Bertoch's case is distinguishable from Carner and similar to Mirquet. In 
Carner. the officer stopped the defendant and conducted field sobriety tests because, 
upon approaching the car, he discovered an odor of alcohol "coming from the car's 
interior" and noticed the defendant had slurred speech. Carner. 669 P.2d at 1169. On 
appeal, the defendant argued the field sobriety tests violated the Fifth Amendment 
because they constituted custodial interrogation. IcL_ Our supreme court rejected the 
14 
defendant's argument because the "officer was still in the investigatory stage" during the 
field sobriety tests and, "[a]s soon as the officer determined that the defendant's driving 
appeared to be impaired due to alcohol, he did arrest him." Id. at 1172. 
Conversely, in this case, Bertoch does not argue he was in custody simply because 
Witte performed field sobriety tests. Aplt. Br. at 36-40. Rather, Bertoch argues he was 
in custody because Witte, after discovering a controlled substance during the illegal frisk 
and deciding definitively to arrest him, continued investigating him for over an hour 
without ever reading his Miranda rights. Id During this hour, Witte elicited 
incriminatory statements by directly accusing him of carrying a controlled substance and 
paraphernalia and subjecting him to questioning, field sobriety tests, an additional body 
search, a vehicle search, two rides in a patrol car, and a blood test. Id. Thus, as 
discussed in Bertoch's opening brief, this case is similar to Mirquet, where our supreme 
court held the defendant was in custody because the officer "virtually] command[ed]n 
him to "retrieve evidence of a crime" from his vehicle, and should be reversed because 
Bertoch's statements were elicited in violation of the Fifth Amendment.6 Id. at 38-40. 
Second, Zepeda provides too little detail to conduct a meaningful comparison. 
Memorandum decisions are intended to address cases which 
do not present novel issues of law on appeal, with reference 
to well-established precedent arising either from case law or 
from unambiguous statutory language. They are intended to 
6
 A more extensive comparison of Bertoch's case and Mirquet is provided in 
Bertoch's opening brief. See. Aplt. Br. at 38-40. 
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be of use only to the lower tribunal whose work is the subject 
of the appeal, and to the litigants and parties in the case. For 
this reason, memorandum decisions usually dispense with 
much of the background detail common to an opinion. 
Grand County v.Rogers, 2002 UT 25,f7,44 P.3d 734. Thus, memorandum decisions 
may be cited only "to the degree that they are useful, authoritatively and persuasively." 
Id at TJ16. Otherwise, "[e]xisting primary case law is adequate and more appropriate 
because of its more complete reasoning." Id. at ^  17. 
Here, the State suggests this case is similar to Zepeda and thus should be decided 
similarly. Aple. Br. at 18. Zepeda. however, contains no factual summary from which to 
draw a comparison. See Zepeda. 2003 UT App 298. Instead, it simply lists the factors 
considered in other Fifth Amendment cases and summarily concludes the factors do not 
exist in Zepeda. Id. Thus, this Court should not rely on Zepeda to decide Bertoch's case 
because Mirquet is on point and is better suited for case comparison. See. Grand County. 
2002 UT 25 at THJ7-8 (holding memorandum decisions should not be cited where 
"[ejxisting primary case law is adequate" because opinions are "more detailed in their 
treatment of the matter under review so that persons not familiar with the underlying case 
will have sufficient background to understand fully the reasoning and decision reached 
by the appellate court"). 
I). This Court Should Reverse Because No Showing of Prejudice is Required. 
The State argues this Court should not permit Bertoch to withdraw his conditional 
guilty plea unless he obtains "on appeal a 'net judgment' in his favor or otherwise 
16 
significantly change[s] the relationship of the parties." Aple. Br. at 15-16 (citation 
omitted). Specifically, the State argues that if this Court holds the evidence was 
admissible as a valid search incident to arrest, "only suppression of [Bertoch's] 
statements made during the pat-down would result" and "this result would not entitle 
[Bertoch] to vacation of his guilty plea." IcL at 14-15. This Court should not adopt the 
State's argument, however, because it relies on civil case law even though there is 
criminal case law directly on point.7 Icl 
Rule 1 l(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure says, "A defendant who 
prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the [conditional plea of guilty]." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 1 l(i). This rule "allows a defendant entering a conditional plea to reserve the 
right to appeal 'the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion,' not just 
dispositive ones." State v. Montova. 887 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added :^ see State v. Rivera. 943 P.2d 1344,1346 (Utah 1997) (same). In other 
words, a defendant appealing an issue reserved through a conditional guilty plea need not 
show prejudice. See State v. Linderen. 910 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
7
 Specifically, the State's derives its definition of "prevailing party" from civil 
case law interpreting the term "prevailing party" as it is used in attorney fee statutes. See 
Aple. Br. at 15-16; Texas State Teachers Assoc, v. Garland Independent School Dist.. 
489 U.S. 782 (1989) (holding "prevailing party" is a statutory term for deciding the 
availability of attorney fees); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy. 2002 
UT App 73,47 P.3d 92 (same); J. Pochvnok Co. v. Smedsrud. 2003 UT App 375, 80 
P.3d 563 (same); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Lacv. 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (same); R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 2002 UT 11,40 P.3d 1119 (same). 
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(holding in conditional plea context, appellate court must presume prejudice). 
For example, in Rivera, the defendant pleaded "no contest to count II to avoid 
facing charges on counts I and III, but he expressly reserved his right to appeal the 
court's decision to permit prosecution under counts I and II." Rivera, 943 P.2d at 1346. 
This Court affirmed because it "found that Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 l(i) 'does 
not allow review of the denial of pretrial motions relating to charges which were 
dismissed and to which the defendant did not enter a plea.'" IdL_ at 1345. Our supreme 
court reversed because a defendant's plea bargain "cannot be enforced until the condition 
he relied on is satisfied." IdL at 1346. Specifically, the defendant "proceeded on the 
understanding that if he won on appeal, he could renegotiate with the prosecutor for a 
new agreement." Id Moreover, if he wins on appeal, the defendant "will be in the 
position to negotiate a more favorable agreement with the prosecutor." Id. Thus: 
[T]he court of appeals' decision to enforce a conviction 
reached on the basis of [the defendant's] conditional plea 
while refusing to review his bindover as to count I is unfair 
and therefore contrary to the public policy articulated in Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 1(b): 
"These rules are intended and shall be 
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, 
fairness in administration, and the elimination 
of unnecessary expense and delay." (Emphasis 
added.) 
14 
Similarly, here, even if this Court decides only the statements should have been 
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suppressed, Bertoch is entitled to withdraw his plea. Bertoch pleaded guilty to a third 
degree felony with the understanding that he could appeal the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress. R. 296:5. Then, if he was successful on appeal, he would be 
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and either go to trial without the suppressed 
evidence or negotiate a new guilty plea that reflected the State's weakened position after 
appeal. IdL In other words, even if only the statements should have been suppressed, 
Bertoch's case and bargaining power are stronger absent the inadmissible statements and 
he is entitled to withdraw his plea and renegotiate his case from his strengthened 
position. See Rivera. 943 P.2d at 1346. Thus, it does not matter whether Bertoch's 
appeal is dispositive because Bertoch entered his plea with the understanding that he 
could appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and his plea bargain 
"cannot be enforced until the condition he relied on is satisfied." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Bertoch's conviction because the trial court erred by 
denying Bertoch's motion to suppress the evidence taken in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and the statements taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
SUBMITTED this 7 7 * day of June, 2004. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Robert D. Moyer was indicted for possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-
248. The trial court suppressed the cocaine seized from 
Moyer on the ground that it was discovered as the result of 
an illegal search. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues 
that notwithstanding the initial unreasonable search, the 
evidence would inevitably have been discovered through 
lawful means and, as such, should not have been 
suppressed. Because we find no evidence in the record to 
support a finding of inevitable discovery, we affirm the 
trial court's suppression order. 
BACKGROUND 
At approximately 12:45 a.m. on April 13, 1993, 
Fairfax City Police Officer Mraz observed Moyer drive 
through a red light. When [*2] Officer Mraz pulled his 
vehicle behind Mover's car and activated his emergency 
equipment, he saw Moyer reach down and appear to place 
something between the front seats. When Moyer stopped, 
Officer Mraz shined his flashlight into the car in an attempt 
to determine what Moyer had placed between the seats. 
However, because of a lot of "stuff thrown about," he was 
unable to see the item. When Officer Mraz approached 
Moyer, he detected a strong odor of alcohol. As a result, 
Officer Mraz requested Moyer to get out of his vehicle in 
order to conduct a field sobriety test. 
Moyer said that he would exit from the passenger side, 
because the driver's door had been damaged. As Moyer 
crawled head first across to the passenger's side of the car, 
Officer Mraz saw Moyer reach down, pick something up, 
and place it in the right front pocket of the jacket he was 
wearing. Officer Mraz was unable to determine the nature 
of the object. 
After Moyer got out of the car, he stood along the 
passenger side of the car with his hands in his jacket 
pockets. Officer Mraz, concerned that the object Moyer 
picked up could have been a weapon or drugs, asked 
Moyer, at least twice, to take his hands out of his pocket 
[*3] and place whatever he had in his pocket on top of the 
vehicle. When Moyer did not comply, Officer Mraz drew 
his service revolver and ordered him to place both his 
hands on the vehicle. After Moyer did so, Officer Mraz 
reached directly in Mover's right jacket pocket and 
removed a baggie containing eleven individual packets of 
cocaine. Officer Mraz handcuffed Moyer and placed him 
in the back of his police cruiser. After searching Moyer's 
vehicle, Officer Mraz got Moyer out of the police cruiser, 
removed the handcuffs and had Moyer perform field 
sobriety tests. At the completion of the tests, Officer Mraz 
placed Moyer under arrest for driving while intoxicated. 
In ruling on Moyer's motion to suppress, the trial judge 
stated: 
I'm going to grant the motion to suppress.. 
[A] pat down is required, under these circumstances. 
And that the officer did not conduct that, in this case. 
I know there was ~ I accept that there was a reasonable 
1994 Va.App. LEXIS 108,* 
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basis for the stop. 
I will also accept that there was a 
reasonable - and 
I will so find - that there was a reasonable basis for the 
officer to be concerned that the Defendant might have a 
weapon in his clothing. 
And [*4] I, certainly, accept that the 
officer would be nervous. I would be, 
believe me, a lot more nervous than the 
officer would have been, if I were in these 
circumstances. 
However, I believe that the officer left out 
the critical step of the pat down. I don't 
think that 
he can just immediately go in and start emptying pockets 
or doing a search of somebody's clothing like that, without 
having taken that extra step of a pat down, to see if there is 
anything in his pocket that does feel like a weapon. 
* * * * * * * 
The ironic part of this is the man was going 
to be arrested for D. W.I., anyway. And the 
car would have been searched or he would 
have been searched at the Adult Detention 
Center. 
The Commonwealth's attorney responded: "Then the 
argument is, Your Honor, at that point in time, then he's, 
eventually, going to be searched anyway That it would 
have been found through a lawful search." In rejecting this 
argument, the trial court stated: 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule, 
though, is 
not to determine whether or not something would have 
been, ultimately, allowable into evidence, if it had been 
properly seized. 
The purpose [*5] of the exclusionary rule 
is to 
discourage the police from conducting inappropriate 
searches, to begin with. 
That's the whole intention of it. And, while 
the result in this particular case is that 
something 
that was, in fact, a crime is going to go unpunished, that's 
the result that's going to obtain here. 
The legality of the initial traffic stop was not challenged by 
Moyer. The Commonwealth's evidence concerned only the 
circumstances surrounding the seizure and search of 
Moyer. The record fails to disclose any evidence regarding 
standard arrest or search procedures employed by the 
Fairfax City Police Department in drunk driving cases. 
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
When reviewing the ruling on a suppression motion, 
we consider the evidence most favorably to the prevailing 
party below. "The judgment of a trial court sitting without 
a j u ry . . . will not be set aside unless . . . plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it." Martin v. Commonwealth, 
4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E2d 415, 418 (1987). The 
burden to show reversible error rests upon the appellant, 
the Commonwealth in this instance. Reynolds v. 
Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 436, 388S.K2d659, 663 
(1990). [*6] 
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court clearly 
erred when it refused to admit, under the "inevitable 
discovery" doctrine, the cocaine seized from Moyer. We 
disagree. In Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431, 81 L. Ed 2d 
377, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), the United States Supreme 
Court held that the fruits of an unconstitutional search 
should be admitted under the following conditions: 
If the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately or inevitably would 
have been discovered by lawful means 
. . . then the deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule] 
has so little basis that the evidence should be received. 
Id at 444. 
In Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 639, 347 
S.E.2d 175 (1986), we approved the following three-part 
test that the Commonwealth's evidence must satisfy for 
application of the inevitable discovery exception: 
"(1) a reasonable probability that the 
evidence in question would have been 
discovered by lawful means 
but for the police misconduct, (2) that the leads making the 
discovery inevitable were possessed by the police at the 
time of [*7] the misconduct, and (3) that the police also 
prior to the misconduct were actively pursuing the 
alternative line of investigation." 
Id at 656, 347 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting United States v. 
Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985) (other 
citations omitted)). It is well settled that the 
Commonwealth has the burden of establishing the 
1994 Va App LEXIS 108,* 
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applicability of the exception See, e g, Warhck v 
Commonwealth 215 Va 263, 208 S E 2d 746 (1974), 
Keeterv Commonwealth, 222 Va 134, 278 SE 2d 841, 
cert denied, 454 US 1053, 70 L Ed 2d 589 102 S Ct 
598 (1981) In the case at bar, the Commonwealth failed to 
present any evidence to support a finding that there was "a 
reasonable probability that the evidence in question would 
have been discovered by lawful means but for the police 
misconduct" Walls, 2 Va App at 656, 347 SE 2d at 185 
The only evidence presented by the Commonwealth 
relevant to the issue of inevitable discovery was that Moyer 
was given a field sobriety test and was later arrested for 
driving while intoxicated No evidence or argument was 
presented regarding [*8] the normal course of police 
investigation and procedures in cases of this nature 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that there 
is insufficient evidence to satisfy the application of the 
inevitable discovery exception Accordingly, we affirm the 
trial court's suppression order 
Affirmed 
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